ESSAY
The Spymaster Gets a Pass
There used to be something vaguely inspiring to me about the idea of confirmation hearings. They seemed to hold the promise of journalistic nobility: not only might a reporter bear witness to constitutional process, but he or she might also scrutinize nominees and issues for the public good. Unfortunately, this notion has been trumped in recent years by the press's embrace of a conventional wisdom that holds that the president should be able to choose whomever he wants for whatever position, and so the examination should be perfunctory.
There are, of course, exceptions: the nomination of federal judges can always have serious sturm-und-drang showdown potential. The controversial Otto Reich might have provided a serious hearing if the administration hadn't found a way around it last year. But considerations for positions in the national security apparatus — so invigorated, post-9/11 — are now more or less rubber-stamp affairs for both legislators and reporters. For example, when Christina Rocca was appointed to the State Department in 2001, no senator or journalist asked her, let alone mentioned, anything about her fifteen-year Central Intelligence Agency career. Yet even by that standard, things hit a new low on February 27.
On that day, the Senate Armed Services Committee convened to question the political appointee who would have responsibility for orchestrating what may be the most ambitious, if not ominous, consolidation of power in U.S. intelligence community history. In anticipation of this event, I scanned the wires and watched the channels for days before, during, and after. If anyone from the press showed up to cover the confirmation hearing, there was no evidence of it. Indeed, there was virtually no mention of the event anywhere in the media.
Nominated to fill the position of undersecretary of defense for Intelligence, Stephen A. Cambone — a Rumsfeld loyalist rising rapidly through the Defense Department's senior ranks — didn't even merit the undivided attention of his overseers, but was wedged in with nominees for subcabinent positions in the Energy and Army departments.
That was more than a little troubling. The gist of Cambone's brief turn before the committee essentially boiled down to this: Trust me. Just because I'm going to be the first person to have direct control over every defense intelligence agency — NSA, NRO, NIMA, DIA, etc. — and their budgets; even though I work for a secretary with a well-documented history of Machiavellian power plays; even though I'm part of a clique with a reputation for seeking the intelligence analysis that meshes with its ideological goals — I certainly won't be a competitor to the director of Central Intelligence.
Cambone was essentially sent on his way with a pat on the head, and subsequently confirmed — again, with no substantial notice in the press — on March 7.
By the time The New York Times acknowledged Cambone's new billet as Rumsfeld's intelligencer in the April 11 issue, the newly minted undersecretary was full of muscularly cryptic comments. Had the Pentagon hawks politicized intelligence in the push for war with Iraq, the Times asked? "Any policy maker has certain views," Cambone said. "Policy makers are where they are and doing what they do because they have a view." If there was a follow-up exchange seeking clarification, it wasn't included in the story. The Times went on to quote Cambone as saying his job was "not to shape" analyses, but to properly direct work. Any real difference between "shape" and direct? Either not fit to print or not fit to ask.
All this was reminiscent of Cambone's hearing (along with other interested parties, I pored over the transcript as soon it was available), in which restrained questioning by the senators and creative use of language by Cambone left much open to interpretation. In search of clarity, I rustled up Cambone's answers to a prehearing questionnaire put to him by the committee staff. That document was far more illuminating.
Explaining his job as "exercising authority, direction and control" of all Pentagon intelligence, Cambone said that he would have total responsibility for all information to be "collected, analyzed, and distributed," as well as the "conduct" of buffed-up "counter-intelligence operations." In the questionnaire, Cambone further noted the need for database sharing between his intelligence operations and civilian law enforcement, a move that is sure to give constitutionalists pause. He wrote of the desirability of disseminating certain intelligence analysis "without source attribution." And he discussed how he would "consult, and coordinate . . . to ensure DoD-related intelligence activity supports the goals" of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, to whom he would "ensure timely delivery of intelligence information." (Critics call Feith's directorate the home of all manner of hidden and ideologically motivated efforts since 9/11.)
Over the past couple of months, I've had numerous conversations with retired and active intelligence officers (military and civilian), staff people from watchdog nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the intelligence community, intelligence scholars, and some congressional staff members. All agree that the new intelligence undersecretary at the Pentagon is not only someone who bears watching, particularly in a time when recent intelligence has been suspect, but that, judging from the coverage surrounding his confirmation, the press couldn't care less.
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